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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
NELDA GARCIA, : 
Plaintiff/Appellant, : Case No. 890649-CA 
v. : 
FRED C. SCHWENDIMAN, Chief, : 
Driver License Services, 
Department of Public Safety, : 
State of Utah, Category No. 14(b) 
Defendant/Appellee. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from the final Judgment of the Third 
Judicial District Court which, after review de novo, affirmed the 
decision of the Division of Driver License Services to revoke for 
one year, the driving privilege of Appellant Nelda L. Garcia. It 
is not disputed that this court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(a) and Utah R. App. P. 3(a). 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether Garcia's failure to continue to blow into 
the Intoxilyzer until a printed result was obtained constitutes a 
"refusal" under Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10(2) (1989). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10 (1953). 
Utah R. Civ. P. 52. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the final Judgment of the Third 
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, the Honorable Raymond J. Uno, presiding. 
After review de novo, Judge Uno affirmed the decision 
of the Division of Driver Licence Services, to revoke for a 
period of one year, the driving privileges of Appellant Nelda L. 
Garcia. Judge Uno concluded that Garcia had failed to comply 
with Utah Code Ann, § 41-6-44.10 by refusing to do what was 
necessary to provide a viable breath sample for the intoxilyzer 
test. 
Garcia moved for and received a Stay of the Order of 
Revocation of her operator's licence pending this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
On March 30, 1989, Appellant, Nelda L. Garcia (Garcia) 
was arrested by West Valley City Police Officer LaMar A. Burns 
(Officer Burns) for driving under the influence of alcohol. 
(Trial Transcript, Filed 1/2/90, (hereinafter T.) 9). Officer 
Burns requested that Garcia take a chemical test (intoxilyzer 
test) to determine her blood alcohol content. Garcia verbally 
consented to the test (T. 10). 
After arriving at the station, Officer Burns, a 
certified intoxilyzer operator, prepared the machine for use by 
going through an operational checklist (T. 10-11). He then 
instructed Garcia in the proper use of the machine (T. 11). 
Garcia then blew into the machine, but did not continue blowing 
long enough to provide a sufficient sample. Officer Burns 
instructed Garcia that she needed to blow longer into the machine 
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(T. 11-12). Officer Burns even changed the mouthpiece, but Garcia 
would pull away and refuse to blow until the machine could obtain 
an adequate sample (T. 13). Officer Burns then advised Garcia 
that failure to give an adequate sample would result in the 
revocation of her licence for a period of one year and admonished 
her to again blow into the machine (T. 14). During further 
attempts, Garcia continued to pull away from the machine and 
never provided a sufficient breath sample. Officer Burns 
recorded the digital read-out visible on the machine (T. 13-15), 
informed Garcia that her failure to give an adequate sample would 
be considered a refusal, and turned off the machine. Garcia made 
no request to try the test again. Monthly technical tests 
established that the machine had been functioning properly before 
and after Garcia's test (See Appendix "D"; Utah Dept. of Public 
Safety Record of Intoxilyzer Test and Affidavits dated March 17, 
1989 and April 17, 1989). Garcia did not complain of any 
impairment which would affect her ability to perform the test (T. 
15). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The overwhelming authority supports the conclusion that 
refusal to take an intoxilyzer test need not be verbal. Several 
Courts, including the Supreme Court of this State have held that 
the purpose of the implied consent statute is to require the 
driver to do whatever is necessary to determine their state of 
intoxication. Therefore, failure to do whatever is necessary, 
has been held to be a refusal pursuant to the provisions of the 
statute. In addition, the digital read-out recorded by Officer 
Burns is not an accurate measure of a driver's blood alcohol 
content. o_ 
Finally, the issue of refusal is an issue of fact, to 
be determined by the trial court. It is only reversible upon a 
showing that the lower court's determination was clearly 




BY FAILING TO DO WHAT WAS NECESSARY TO 
MEASURE HER BLOOD ALCOHOL CONTENT, GARCIA 
REFUSED TO SUBMIT TO CHEMICAL TESTING 
PURSUANT TO THE UTAH IMPLIED CONSENT STATUTE. 
Utah's implied consent statute, Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-
44.10(2)(a) (1989), provides in pertinent part: 
If any person has been placed under arrest, 
and has then been requested by a peace 
officer to submit to any one or more of the 
chemical tests under Subsection (1), and 
refuses to submit to the chemical test, or 
any one or all of the tests requested, the 
person shall be warned by a peace officer 
requesting the test or tests that a refusal 
to submit to the test or tests can result in 
revocation of his license to operate a motor 
vehicle. 
Garcia contends that she did nothing to constitute a 
volitional refusal to take the test. In Beck v. Cox, 597 P.2d 
1335 (Utah 1979), the Utah Supreme Court held that a refusal 
under the implied consent statute does not mean that the driver 
must verbally refuse to comply with the test, nor does it suggest 
that the driver must be obstinate or uncooperative. The Court 
determined that a refusal, is simply a volitional failure to do 
whatever is necessary to perform the test. 
There is no mysterious meaning to the word 
'refusal'. In the context of the implied 
consent law, it simply means that an 
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arrestee, after having been requested to take 
the breathalyzer test, declines to do so of 
his own volition. Whether the declination is 
accomplished by verbally saying, 'I refuse', 
or by remaining silent and just not breathing 
or blowing into the machine, or by vocalizing 
some sort of qualified or conditional consent 
or refusal, does not make any difference. 
The volitional failure to do what is 
necessary in order that the test can be 
performed is a refusal. 
Id. at 1338 (emphasis added). 
The Court further stated: 
Plaintiff, however, presses upon us the 
argument that under the law a refusal must be 
an express, unequivocal refusal before a 
drivers's license may be revoked. 
This interpretation of the statute would 
effectively emasculate it and is without 
foundation in authority or logic. If this 
argument were accepted, any person driving 
under the influence of alcohol could avoid 
having his license revoked by temporizing, 
equivocating, or simply remaining silent, as 
the facts of this case clearly illustrate. 
The irony of the argument is that a person 
inebriated to the point of unconsciousness 
would be saved from the loss of his license. 
It is the reality of the situation that must 
govern, and a refusal in fact, regardless of 
the words that accompany it, can be as 
convincing as an express verbal refusal. 
Id. at 1337, 1338. 
In Cowan v. Schwendiman, 769 P.2d 280 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989) the Utah Court of Appeals decided a case very similar to 
the current controversy. Mr. Cowan was taken to the police 
station for an intoxilyzer test. His first test was invalid 
because he had been chewing tobacco. When the officer recogniz 
the error, he requested that Cowan submit to a second test. 
Although verbally agreeing to further testing the plaintiff did 
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not provide the requisite breath sample. The Court concluded 
that this behavior constituted a refusal and stated: 
[W]hen asked to breathe into the testing 
machine on each occasion, appellant 
obstructed the process by sticking his tongue 
over and chewing on the mouthpiece and 
blowing out the sides of his mouth. This 
conduct prevented the officers from obtaining 
an adequate viable breath sample for testing. 
Id. at 281. 
The courts of this State have clearly established that 
a refusal may occur despite words or intentions signifying 
compliance. In Mathie v. Schwendiman, 656 P.2d 463 (Utah 1982) 
the driver repeatedly affirmed to the officer his intent to 
comply with the tests; however, he refused to remove a piece of 
gum from his mouth. The Utah Supreme Court held: 
In Beck v. Cox, (citation omitted) this Court 
declared that a refusal to take a chemical 
test may be established on the basis of 
conduct of the motorist, if he has been asked 
to take the test. Quoting Spradling v. 
Deimeke, (citation omitted) this Court said: 
'the volitional failure to do what is 
necessary in order that the test can be 
performed is a refusal.' 
Id. at 464. 
Similarly, in Conrad v. Schwendiman, 680 P.2d 736 (Utah 
1984) when the arresting officer requested that Conrad submit to 
a breathalyzer test, Conrad replied that he would take a blood 
test instead. The Utah Supreme Court noted: 
Plaintiff's failure to agree to take the 
breathalyzer test after having been asked at 
least four times to do so is undeniably a 
refusal to take the test. It is not 
necessary that the refusal be in unequivocal 
terms. It is sufficient if the behavior of 
the driver indicates his intention to refuse. 
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Id- at 738. 
Volitional failure to do what is necessary in order to 
obtain a viable breath sample is a refusal, regardless of what 
the person may say or do to indicate compliance. Failure to 
provide an adequate breath sample has been held in numerous 
jurisdictions to constitute a refusal- See Brinkerhoff v-
Commonwealth Department of Transportation Bureau of Traffic 
Safety, 430 A.2d 339 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1981) (Brinkerhoff tried to 
"blow into the machine between ten and fifteen times • . . but he 
could not introduce sufficient air into the breathalyzer for it 
to analyze-"); Matter of Pinyatello, 36 N.C- App. 542, 245 S-E.2d 
185 (1978) (Pinyatello "blew as hard as he could but the machine 
did not register."); White v- State Department of Public Safety, 
361 So.2d 265 (La. App. 1978) (Plaintiff testified that he did 
not refuse-he just couldn't blow harder due to a medical 
condition); Woolman v. State, Department of Motor Vehicles, 15 
Wash. App. 115, 547 P.2d 293 (1976) ("Woolman did not articulate 
in any verbal way an unqualified refusal to take the breathalyzer 
test. She did put the mouthpiece of the breathalyzer into her 
mouth and she did blow into it, but not enough to cause the 
machine to operate. . . " ) ; Application of Kunneman, 501 P.2d 
910 (Okla. App. 1972) ("We therefore hold that even though one 
charged with the crime of driving while under the influence of 
intoxicating beverages orally states he will submit to a 
breathalyzer test, but refuses to blow his breath into the 
machine is a non-verbal refusal."). 
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Garcia asserts that because she verbally gave her 
consent to the breath test, she complied and should not have her 
license revoked. However, she failed to do what was necessary to 
provide an adequate breath sample. Officer Burns testified that 
on at least four occasions she put the mouthpiece in her mouth, 
gave a small puff, and then pulled away. Despite his warnings 
that she could lose her license, and despite his efforts to 
encourage her to comply, Garcia refused to do what was necessary 
to provide an adequate breath sample. 
Providing an adequate breath sample is not a difficult 
thing. Garcia testified that she had no medical condition which 
prevented her from compliance with the Officer's requests. The 
uncontroverted facts are simply that Garcia never attempted to 
provide a longer breath sample. Finding otherwise in this case, 
would make it easy for everybody to refuse to take a test, but, 
still not have their license revoked. They would merely have to 
put the mouthpiece to their mouth, blow for a second or two, not 
long enough to give a printed reading, and then allege 
compliance. 
POINT II 
THE DIGITAL READ-OUT RECORDED BY OFFICER 
BURNS IS NOT AN ACCURATE MEASURE OF BLOOD 
ALCOHOL CONTENT. 
Garcia contends that the digital read-out recorded by 
Officer Burns is the equivalent of a printed read out for the 
purpose of interpreting her blood alcohol level. Her argument 
fails to comprehend the basic mechanics of the intoxilyzer. The 
intoxilyzer provides a digital read-out of the blood alcohol 
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level immediately upon detection of alcohol in the breath. 
However, this read-out is not accurate since it is the "deep 
lung" sample which gives the correct blood alcohol level (T. 15). 
The "deep lung" sample is not obtained until a person has exhaled 
into the machine for a period of time required to produce the 
printed read-out. Officer Burns' uncontroverted testimony was 
that a "deep lung" sample was necessary in order to obtain an 
accurate reading (T. 14). Garcia provided no evidence to the 
contrary, and no evidence indicating the visual read-out was 
accurate. Upon cross examination, Officer Burns testified that 
he had never given testimony in court based on a digital reading. 
The facts of the instant case are similar to those in 
Jones v. Motor Vehicles Division, 90 Or. App. 143, 750 P.2d 1203 
(1987). The Oregon Court of Appeals analyzing a statute 
substantially similar to Utah's implied consent statute stated: 
"The only issue is whether petitioner's failure to continue to 
blow into the Intoxilyzer until a printed result was obtained 
constitutes a 'refusal' under ORS 813.100(3)." Id. at 1204. 
In Jones, the driver blew into the intoxilyzer until a 
.18 registered on the digital display, but he "failed to blow 
long enough and with sufficient force to produce a printout. . ." 
Id. at 1204. The Oregon Court of Appeals found that, despite the 
digital read-out, Jones' failure to provide an adequate breath 
sample for the machine to print, constituted a refusal. The 
Court therefore suspended Jones' license for a year. 
Garcia contends, however, that because she blew enough 
air into the machine for a digital read out to be recorded, her 
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effort cannot be termed a "refusal" A similar argument was made 
in Newman v. Stinson, 489 S.W.2d 826 (Ky. 1972). After blowing 
into the equipment once, and failing to give an adequate sample, 
the driver refused to blow again on grounds that he had complied 
with the law. The court held: 
The statute does not prescribe any particular 
volume of air which must be breathed into the 
equipment to constitute compliance. In the 
absence of a showing of the impossibility of 
compliance or the likelihood of harm 
resulting therefrom, we feel that the 
requirement of submission to the test 
contemplates that a sufficient sample be 
given to permit a test to be made and a test 
result obtained. The appellee did not 
sufficiently comply. 
Id. at 828 
POINT III 
WHETHER GARCIA REFUSED TO TAKE THE BLOOD 
ALCOHOL TEST IS A QUESTION OF FACT, 
DETERMINED BY THE TRIAL COURT AND NOT 
REVIEWABLE EXCEPT UPON A SHOWING OF CLEAR 
ERROR. 
Refusal is a question of fact. In Wolf v. State 
Department of Motor Vehicles, 27 Wash. App. 214, 616 P.2d 688 
(1980) the Court said: 
Unwillingness to cooperate in the 
administration of a breathalyzer test is a 
refusal to take the test (citations omitted). 
Whether the driver's conduct amounts to a 
refusal to take the test is a question of 
fact. 
^d. at 690. 
Rule 52, Utah R. Civ. P. states: "Findings of fact, 
whether based on oral or documentary evidence shall not be set 
aside unless clearly erroneous. ..." This rule finds wide 
support in the appellate courts of this state. "On appeal of a 
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judgment from the bench after trial, the appellate court defers 
to the trial courts factual assessment unless there is clear 
error." Copper State Leasing Co. v. Blacker Appliance & 
Furniture Co., 770 P.2d 88 (Utah 1988)- In Lopez v. Schwendiman, 
720 P.2d 778 (Utah 1986), the Court stated: 
In a trial de novo, the district court must 
determine by a preponderance of evidence 
'whether the petitioner's license is subject 
to revocation under the provisions of this 
chapter.' (citations omitted). Our review of 
that determination is deferential to the 
trial court's review of the evidence unless 
the trial court has misapplied principles of 
law or its findings are clearly against the 
weight of the evidence. 
Id. at 780. 
Garcia has not raised an issue of law, nor has her 
counsel attempted to present evidence that the trial court's 
findings were clearly erroneous. Even a cursory review of Utah 
law in this area would have revealed that the issue of refusal is 
well settled in this State. The Court of Appeals in deciding 
Cowan v. Schwendiman, 769 P.2d 280 (Utah 1989) stated: 
Based on well-settled authority in Utah, we 
reject appellant's contentions as frivolous. 
The revocation of appellant's driver's 
license is summarily affirmed. A sanction of 
double costs is awarded to respondent, 
pursuant to R. Utah Ct. App. 33(a). 
Id. at 282. 
This appeal is frivolous and contrary to the clear 
principles of law firmly established by the courts of this state. 
Appellant's brief fails to raise appealable issues. Further, 
Appellant's brief is merely a restatement of the trial 
transcript, citing no authority in support of her position. 
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CONCLUSION 
Because Garcia refused to provide an adequate air 
sample when expressly instructed to do so, she failed to comply 
with Utah Code § 41-6-44.10. Therefore, her licence was properly 
suspended. Both the Hearing Officer and the Trial Court properly 
concluded that, given the vast authority on the subject, Garcia's 
actions constituted a volitional refusal. 
DATED this ^ day of June, 1990. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
RICHARD D. WYSS 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the 
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Francis J. Nielson, attorney for appellant, 310 South Main, Suite 




41-6-44.10. Implied consent to chemical tests for alcohol or 
drug — Number of tests — Refusal — Warning, 
report — Hearing, revocation of license — Ap-
peal — Person incapable of refusal — Results of 
test available — Who may give test — Evidence. 
(1) (a) A person operating a motor vehicle in this state is considered to 
have given hjrs consent to a chemical test or tests of his breath, blood, or 
urine for the purpose of determining whether he was operating or in 
actual physical control of a motor vehicle while having a blood or breath 
alcohol content statutorily prohibited, or while under the influence of 
alcohol, any drug, or combination of alcohol and any drug under Section 
41-6-44, if the test is or teste are administered at the direction of a peace 
officer having grounds to believe that person to have been operating or m 
actual physical control of a motor vehicle while having a blood or breath 
alcohol content statutorily prohibited, or while under the influence of 
alcohol, any drug, or combination of alcohol and any drug under Section 
41-6-44. 
(b) The peace officer determines which of the tests are administered 
and how many of them are administered, except the officer shall request 
that either the blood or urine test be administered under Section 
76-5-207. If an officer requests more than one test, refusal by a person to 
take one or more requested tests, even though he doesTsubmit to any other 
rgguested tept nr *gg*s, ig Q rpfusaj under this section. 
(c) A person who has been requested under this section to submit to a 
chemical test or tests of his breath, blood, or urine, may not select the test 
or tests to be administered. The failure ° r inability of a p??rp nffjrpr_t.o 
arrange for any specific test is not a defense to taking a test rPfllIpfitpf* hy 
a peace officer, and it is not a defense in any criminal, civil, or adminis-
trative proceeding resulting from a person's refusal to submit to the re-
quested test or tests. 
(2) (a) If the person has been placed under arrest, and has then been re-
quested by a peace officer to submit to any one or more of the chemical 
tests under Subsection (1), and refuses to submit to the chemical test or 
any one or all of the tests requested, the person shall be warned by a 
peace officer requesting the test or tests that a refusal to submit to the 
test or tests can result in revocation of his license to operate a motor 
vehicle. Following this warning, unless the person immediately requests 
that the chemical test or tests as offered by a peace officer be adminis-
tered, no test may be given. A peace officer shall serve on the person, on 
behalf of the division, immediate notice of the division's intention to re-
voke the person's privilege or license to operate a motor vehicle. If the 
officer serves the immediate notice on behalf of the division, he shall: 
(i) take the Utah license certificate or permit, if any, of the opera-
tor; 
(ii) issue a temporary license effective for only 30 days; and 
(iii) supply to the operator, on a form approved by the division, 
basic information regarding how to obtain a hearing before the divi-
sion. A citation issued by a peace officer may, if approved as to form 
by the division, serve also as the temporary license. The peace officer 
shall submit a signed report, within five days after the date of the 
arrest, that he had grounds to believe the arrested person had been 
operating or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while 
having a blood or breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited or 
while under the influence of alcohol or any drug or combination of 
alcohol and any drug under Section 41-6-44 and that the person had 
refused to submit to a chemical test or tests under Subsection (1). 
(b) A person who has been notified of the division's intention to revoke 
his license under this section is entitled to a hearing. A request for the 
hearing shall be made in writing, and within ten days after the date of 
the arrest. Within 20 days after receiving a written request, the division 
shall notify the person of his opportunity to be heard as early as practica-
ble. If the person does not make a timely written request for a hearing 
Delore tfte division, ftis privilege to operate a motor vehicle in Utah shall 
be revoked for a period of one year beginning on the 31st day after the 
date of arrest 
(c) If a hearing is requested by the person and conducted by the divi-
sion, and the division determines that the person was requested to submit 
to a chemical test or tests and refused to submit to the test or tests, or if 
the person fails to appear before the division as required in the notice, the 
division shall revoke his license or permit to operate a motor vehicle in 
Utah for one year, beginning on the date the hearing is held The division 
shall also assess against the person, in addition to any fee imposed under 
Subsection 41-2-112(6), a fee under Section 41-2-103, which shall be paid 
before the person's driving privilege is reinstated, to cover administrative 
costs The fee shall be cancelled if the person obtains an unappealed court 
decision following a proceeding allowed under this subsection that the 
revocation was improper 
(d) (l) Any person whose license has been revoked by the division un-
der this section may seek judicial review 
(n) Judicial review of an informal adjudicative proceeding is a 
trial Venue is in the district court in the county in which the person 
resides 
(3) Any person who is dead, unconscious, or in any other condition render-
ing him incapable of refusal to submit to any chemical test or tests is consid-
ered to not have withdrawn the consent provided for in Subsection (1), and the 
test or tests may be administered whether the person has been arrested or not 
(4) Upon the request of the person who was tested, the results of the test or 
tests shall be made available to him 
(5) (a) Only a physician, registered nurse, practical nurse, or person autho-
rized under Subsection 26-1-30(19), acting at the request of a peace offi-
cer, may withdraw blood to determine the alcoholic or drug content This 
limitation does not apply to the taking of a urine or breath specimen 
(b) Any physician, registered nurse, practical nurse, or person autho-
rized under Subsection 26-1-30(19) who, at the direction of a peace officer, 
drawrs a sample of blood from any person whom a peace officer has reason 
to believe is driving m violation of this chapter, or hospital or medical 
facility at which the sample is drawn, is immune from any civil or crimi-
nal liability arising from drawing the sample, if the test is administered 
according to standard medical practice 
(6) (a) The person to be tested may, at his own expense, have a physician of 
his own choice administer a chemical test in addition to the test or tests 
administered at the direction of a peace officer 
(b) The failure or inability to obtain the additional test does not affect 
admissibility of the results of the test or tests taken at the direction of a 
peace officer, or preclude or delay the test or tests to be taken at the 
direction of a peace officer 
(c) The additional test shall be subsequent to the test or tests adminis-
tered at the direction of a peace officer 
(7) For the purpose of determining whether to submit to a chemical test or 
tests, the person to be tested does not have the right to consult an attorney or 
have an attorney, physician, or other person present as a condition for the 
taking of an> test 
(8) If a person under arrest refuses to submit to a chemical test or tests or 
any additional test under this section, evidence of any refusal is admissible in 
any civil or criminal action or proceeding arising out of acts alleged to ha\e 
been committed while the person was operating or in actual physical control 
of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or any drug or combi-
nation of alcohol and any drug 
History C 1953, 41-6-44 10, enacted b> L relating to implied consent to tests and en 
1981, ch 126, § 43, L 1983, ch 99, § 16, acted present § 41 6 44 10 
1987, ch 129, § 3, 1987, ch 138, * 41, 1987, Amendment Notes — The 1987 amend 
ch 161, § 143, 1987 (1st S S ), ch 8, §§ 3, 4, ment by Chapter 129 rewrote the provisions 
1988, ch 148, § 1 of Subsection (2» as last amended by Laws 
Repeals and Enactments — Laws 1981 1983 ch 99 § 16 to the extent that a detailed 
ch 126 $ 43 repealed former § 41 6 44 10 (L analysis is impracticable and made minor 
1957 ch 80 §[1] 1959 ch 65 § 1, 1967 ch changes in phraseolog} and punctuation 
88 § 3 1969 ch 107 § 3 1977 ch 268 § 4), throughout the entire section 
APPENDIX B 
Rule 52. Findings by the court. 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an 
advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its 
conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 
58A; in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall simi-
larly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the 
grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of 
review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, 
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given 
to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. 
The findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be 
considered as the findings of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings of 
fact and conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open court follow-
ing the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of 
decision filed by the court. The trial court need not enter findings of fact and 
conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule 4Kb). The 
court shall, however, issue a brief written statement of the ground for its 
decision on all motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 
when the motion is based on more than one ground. 
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after 
entry of judgment the court may amend its findings or make additional find-
ings and may amend the judgment accordingly. The motion may be made with 
a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are made 
in actions tried by the court without a jury, the question of the sufficiency of 
the evidence to support the findings may thereafter be raised whether or not 
the party raising the question has made in the district court an objection to 
such findings or has made either a motion to amend them, a motion for judg-
ment, or a motion for a new trial. 
(c) Waiver of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Except in actions 
for divorce, findings of fact and conclusions of law may be waived by the 
parties to an issue of fact: 
(1) by default or by failing to appear at the trial; 
(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause; 
(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in the minutes. 
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1986 amend-
ment, in Subdivision (a), deleted "and" preced-
ing "in granting" in the first sentence, inserted 
the third and fifth sentences, rewrote the sixth 




—Abandonment of contract 
—Advisory verdict 
—Breach of contract 
—Child custod} 
—Contempt 
—Credibility of witnesses 
—Denial of motion 






—Submission by prevailing party 
Court's discretion 
—Water dispute 
Findings of state engineer 
Amendment 
—Motion 
Conformance with original findings 
New trial 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 52, F R C P 
Cross-References. — Masters, Rule 53 
DECISIONS 
Notice of appeal 
Time 
Tolling of appeal period 
When made 
—Overruling or vacation 
Another district judge 
Lack of notice 
Child custody awards 
Criminal cases 
Effect 
—Preclusion of summar\ judgment 
Failure to object to findings 
How findings entered 
Judicial review. 
—Standard of review 
Conclusions of law 
Criminal trials 
Findings of facts by jury 
Juvenile proceedings 
Purpose of rule 
Stipulations 
Sufficiency 
—Allegations of pleadings 
—Burden on appeal 
APPENDIX C 
LyiM_DEPT^_OF_PyBL^^ 
I/W^t/e undersigned, being first duly sworn, state that: 
Breath testing instrument, INTOXILYZER, serial numberJ^S^/^2d^2fr 
located at JyC^%TJl^/l^U $b was properly checked by me/us in 
the course of official duties, on 
This was done by a currently certified technician and according 
to the standards established by the Commissioner of the Utah 
Department of Public Safety. 
This is the official record and notes of this procedure which 
were made at the time these tests were done. 
THE FOLLOWING TESTS WERE MADE: 
( ^E^lectr ical power check: 
(Power switch on power indicator light is on) 
( i/) Temperature check (Ready light is on) 
( ^'Internal purge check: 
Akir pump works, runs for approximately 35 seconds.• 
( ^} Zero set, Error indicator, and Printer Check: 
(Zero set at .000, .001, .002, .003.) 
(With proper zero set, printer works properly)... 
(Error light activates with improper zero set)... 
(Printer deactivated when error light is on) 
ixed absorption calibrator test (if equipped) 
(Reads within +/- .01 of calibration setting).... 
( tS) Checked with known sample: (Simulator, 3 tests 
/within +/- .005 or 5X whichever is the greatest).... 










 ) _AlM^-u^f&Jj££22 
("ZFThe" simulator solution was of the correct kind and 
properly compounded 
( Af The results of this test show that the instrument 







Last prior check of this instrument was done G^„J^_JZ£J&£4&?¥- l&IZfc 
CBRTIFIBD, BRBATH TEST TBCHNICT^*^ 
STATB OF UTAH . ) 
COUNTY Wd£b&£2&&&-, I/We, on oath, s t a t e , jrtiat^the foregoing /Is t r j 
r !^ST 
f JSKSrtSiS. J*0** Pubfe • 
\&&£Z^ c^f^NJOHN | 
SufcibSgraP a n j t e ^ ^ f o r e me t h i s /T^day
 c f ^2?o^ <*£- 19j£_ 
-C^bf^ta^-W^SSS-s: City of Residence,^^*^^!-^^^^^— 
Notary Public*/ . County of Residence. 
1
 y? 
THE YES NO 
TAOKPT^OF.PUHM^ 
he undersigned, being first duly sworn, state that: 
Breath testing instrument, INTOXILYZER, serial number J ? ^ / ^ ^ ^ 2 s ^ 
located atj^£$^'/?JJ/>C/ f^P was properly checked by me/us in 
the course of official duties, on f^j#&&A-^£-2--^//Jj26ltM-
2. This was done by a currently certified technician and according 
to the standards established by the Commissioner of the Utah 
Department of Public Safety. 
3. This is the official record and notes of this procedure which 
were made at the time these tests were done. 
4. I am/we are competent to testify and have personal knowledge of 
the matters alleged in this affidavit. 
_.__ FOLLOWING TESTS WERE MADE: 
( ^ ^Electrical power check: 
(Power switch on power indicator light is on) 
( ^^Temperature check (Ready light is on) 
( /^Tnternal purge check: 
Jtfir pump works, runs for approximately 35 seconds 
( ^f Zero set, Error indicator, and Printer Check: 
(Zero set at .000, .001, .002, .003.) 
(With proper zero set, printer works properly). 
(Error light activates with improper zero set)., 
(Printer deactivated when error light is on)... 
absorption calibrator test (if equipped) 
(Reads within +/- .01 of calibration setting).. 
( ^-Cl^cked with known sample: (Simulator, 3 tests 
within +/- .005 or 5* whichever is the greatest)., 
^"tfives readings in grams of alcohol per 210 liters 
of breath yCx 
REPAIRS REQUIRED (Expla in ) ^0££~J&k0JLl£ie-
( 
€£#.L 
simulator solution was of the correct kind and 
prpperly compounded , 
( ^"tfhe results of this test show that the instrument 











Last p r i o r check of t h i s ins trument was done on //* /£7rff\Gt/ 19>^fe 
CERTIFIED, BRE^dl TEjT TECHNICIANS) , 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY 0?^4^?3^ I/We, on o a t h , s t a t e t h a t t h e 
NotayPufafc t 
JEROLYNJOHN F S757 South 320 West r 
Murray. Utah 84107 ' 
k - * w * ^ SafeofUWt 
ttary Public 
My commission expires 
ire me this /7.^lLday of iSstt^ 19_f.£. 
City of Residence rd^e-4^.-^^S^trl. 
County of Residence_^H^t^3^.^R^iC^=ri 
